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I. INTRODUCTION
Once voting was the American dream; now it is simply a for-
gotten right. Voting was considered a civic duty' with elections be-
ing a community event where everyone would go to his or her local
2polling place and socialize. Some voting experts suggest voting is a
civic ritual.3 "[Voting] should be a philosophical and ethical com-
mitment, and the ceremonial aspects are important. You go to the
polling place, you see the flag, you walk into the booth, you take
your kids with you, and you hand in your ballot."4 Have Americans
forgotten the struggle our ancestors made less than a century ago
to give them the right to vote? "[I] t is hard not to be appalled at
how cavalierly people treat voting in this country. It is tempting to
say that anyone unwilling to sacrifice an hour to exercise the right
to vote doesn't much deserve it."5
This article will explore the barriers to introducing Internet
voting as well as the possible benefits of Internet voting. To under-
stand some of the controversy surrounding Internet voting, first the
evolution of voting will be explained. Second, by presenting the
different types of Internet voting systems, this article explores how
Internet voting systems work. Third, this article critiques two elec-
tions-a straw poll and a presidential preference primary-that
were conducted over the Internet but had inconclusive results.
Fourth, this article explains the results of both California and
Washington's Internet voting committees. Finally, this article exam-
ines the possibility of implementing Internet voting in Minnesota.
1. VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY
OF VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 9 (Donald W. Rogers & Christine Scri-
abine eds., University of Illinois Press 1992) [hereinafter VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY].
2. Derek Dictson & Dan Ray, The Modern Democratic Revolution: An Objective
Survey of Internet-Based Elections, WHITE PAPER (January 2000) at 14, at http://www.
SecurePoll.votingpaper.com [hereinafter Dictson & Ray].
3. Id. at 15. Rick Valelly, an Associate Professor of Political Science at
Swarthmore College, and Curtis Gans of the Committee for the Study of American
Electorate both suggest that Internet voting will cause Americans to lose their civic
ritual (going to polling places to vote) and also diminish the value of voting. Id.
However, Wolf Blitzer, CNN Washington Correspondent, points out the rest of the
election day tradition left unmentioned by his colleagues-the long lines and bad
weather. Id. at 16. "[T]radition alone may not be enough to outweigh the con-
venience of voting over the Internet." Id.
4. Id. at 15 (statement by Tracy Westen, President of the California based
Democracy Network).
5. Id.
1798 [Vol. 27:3
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II. HISTORY OF VOTING
The United States has a popular sovereignty that provides for
rule by the people where the people express their will through elec-
tions." At the beginning of colonial America, only prominent white
male landowners were able to vote,7 while the rest of our ancestors
struggled for suffrage rights.8 It was not until the 1780s that Amer-
ica abandoned the British style of governance 9 and adopted the
United States Constitution creating republicanism. 0 The Constitu-
tion also authorized the states to conduct elections."1
The Constitution was amended over time to provide for all
citizens to vote regardless of their race, gender, and income.
Blacks gained their suffrage rights in 1870 with the passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Women's suffrage rights did not come
6. VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 5.
7. Id.; see also INNOVATIONS IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION, Federal Election
Comm'n, Ballot Security and Accountability 10 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Ballot
Security and Accountability] (stating that only five percent of the adult population
qualified to vote in the first presidential election).
8. VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 5. Suf-
frage rights are the rights to be eligible to cast ballots in elections. Id.
9. Id. at 8. The British style of governance was monarchy, aristocracy, and
the people. Id.
10. Id. at 9. Republicanism is where people elect their own representatives to
voice their beliefs. Id. Early American elections used premarked ballots based on
political parties. California Internet Voting Task Force, A Report on the Feasibility of
Internet Voting, (January 2000) available at http://www.electioncenter.org/voting
/voting-report.html (last visited July 31, 2000) [hereinafter California Internet
Task Force]. In 1888, Massachusetts first utilized the "Australian Secret Ballot." Id.
Other states later followed. Id. "The 'Australian Secret Ballot' is an official ballot
printed at public expense on which all the names of all nominated candidates ap-
pear. It is distributed only at the polling place and voted in secret." Id.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 states "The House of Representatives shall be com-
posed of members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,
and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors .... " U.S. CONST. art. I provides "The Times, Places and Manner of hold-
ing Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 establishes each state's ability to appoint electors. The
Twelfth Amendment provides for electors to vote by ballot in their states. U.S.
CONST. amend. XII.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on the
account of race, color, or previous condition or servitude." Id. However, most ex-
perts would say that the voting discrimination against blacks did not end until after
the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It was passed as an attempt to end
discrimination in voting by prohibiting several southern states and counties from
changing voting procedures without prior federal approval. Dictson & Ray, supra
17992001]
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until fifty years later in 1920 with the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment." The Twenty-fourth Amendment destroyed an eco-
nomic barrier by eliminating poll taxes.'4 In 1971, the Twenty-sixth
Amendment passed, providing suffrage rights for all citizens of
eighteen years or older.1
Voter turnout has declined greatly since the Nineteenth Cen-
tury.16  For presidential elections, the voter turnout was almost
eighty-two percent in 1876, seventy-three percent in 1900, sixty per-
cent in the 1930s and 1950s, fifty-three percent in 1984, and fifty-
one percent in 1988.17 In 1998 the voter turnout in the United
States' general election was less than fifty percent.18 This 1998
turnout ranked 138th out of 170 democratic nations' elections.' 9
Why such a low turnout in recent decades? One commentator
suggests:
The modern voter is not as likely to get as personally in-
volved in political campaigns as his nineteenth-century
counterpart: he or she is more likely to watch thirty-
second political advertisements on television than to at-
tend a political rally. Moreover, while most modern voters
have partisan affiliations, they are less committed to their
party's success than to the success of individual candi-
dates. Finally, modern voters have less confidence than
their nineteenth-century predecessors that their votes
make a difference. Political Scientists have noted a grow-
ing level of alienation among voters based largely on the
feeling or powerlessness-many voters report feeling that
"I don't matter."20 Therefore, a large portion of the elec-
note 2, at 14.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on ac-
count of sex." Id.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote ... shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by rea-
son of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." Id.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age." Id.
16. VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 11-13.
17. Id. Voter turnout was even lower for congressional years and local elec-
tions. Id.
18. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 4.
19. Id.
20. VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OFAMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 14.
1800 (Vol. 27:3
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21
torate is deferring to the political elite to vote.
Two commentators suggest that if people were automatically
registered to vote, they would vote. 2  Another commentator be-
lieves that Americans do not vote because they believe their vote
23does not matter. Also, a large portion of the population cannot
vote because they are nonresidents, felons, or institutionalized.
24
In all elections, ballots are the critical element for calculating
25the results. The means by which ballots are calculated have
changed over America's voting history. In 1869, Thomas Edison• ° 26
invented the first election machine. In the 1920s to 1940s, me-
27chanical lever machines were used to calculate ballots. After
World War II, electronic voting systems emerged.28 Now, "[m]ost
polling places use one of three computer-based technologies:
punch cards, optical scans, or electronic recording."2 9 Absentee
21. Id. at 15. "Like the middling colonialists who deferred to the leadership
of the merchant and planter elite, the modern voter defers to the bureaucrats who
run businesses, government, and even political parties." Id. It is the author's
opinion that in the 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial election, Jesse Ventura was
elected governor as a third party candidate because the electorate came out and
voted; they did not defer to the political elite Republican or Democratic parties.
22. See generally Francis Fox Piven & Richard Cloward, WHY AMERICANS DON'T
VOTE (1988). The author believes automatic registration would make it easier for
people to vote because they would not have to fill out the bureaucratic forms
themselves.
23. See generally Ruy A. Teixeira, WY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE: TURNOUT DE-
CLINE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1984 (1987).
24. VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 113.
Over nine million resident aliens are disenfranchised because they are not citi-
zens. Id. Any persons who have been convicted of felonies are disenfranchised.
Id. Persons who are institutionalized for mental disabilities are disenfranchised
also. Id.
25. Ballot Security and Accountability, supra note 7, at 3.
26. California Internet Voting Task Force, supra note 10, at 8.
27. Ballot Security and Accountability, supra note 7, at 4.
28. Id. The electronic voting systems provided for ballots to be counted by
electronic means. Id.
29. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 9. Thus, Americans do vote by computers.
Id. "Punch cards are simply computer-readable paper ballots, and as such, have all
the problems of paper ballots except for the inaccuracy and slowness of manual
counting." Roy G. Saltman, Voting Systems, THE BELL (May 2000) at 13, available at
http://www.thebell.net/archives/thebelll.l.pdf. The use of punch card ballot
systems began in 1964 in Georgia, Oregon, and California. Id. By 1974, punch
cards were used by ten percent of U.S. voters. Id. Punch cards are problematic
when the punch hole paper is not completely removed, because the paper hole
may become filled when read. Id. Sometimes the punch cards have to be run
through the reader more than once. Id.
The problems with punch cards became apparent in the 2000 Presiden-
2001] 1801
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voting has also become commonplace. In most states, the voter
must request to vote by absentee ballot in person, by mail, or by
phone.30 According to most voting experts, Internet-based voting
technology may dominate the next generation of voting.3'
III. INTRODUCING INTERNET VOTING SYSTEMS
Federal, state, and local governments are already using the
Internet to provide users access to government information and
services. 2 The progress of Internet use by government varies
widely from state to state and city to city.33 "The diversity of gov-
ernment information available reflects significant differences in
government funding, priorities, and openness to new technology. "
Currently consumers use the Internet for a variety of secure ac-
tial election with the Florida punch card voting system under scrutiny. Some bal-
lots were punched incorrectly and others had hanging chads-a piece of the ballot
card. Bush. v. Gore, No. 00-949, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2000) (per curiam).
This scrutiny caused the Florida governor to create a special task force to study
Florida's election process, including the punch card system. Jeb Bush Appoints Task
Force to Recommend Improvements in the Way Florida Votes, CNN (Dec. 14, 2000) at 1, at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALL POLITICS/stories/12/14/fla.elections.
Optical scans were offered as early as 1958 in some counties. Saltman,
supra note 29, at 14. For optical scans, voters make a mark with a pen or pencil in
a small rectangle or circle on the ballot. Id. The "marks are distinguished by the
different quality of the reflection made by a mark as distinguished from a no-mark,
in response to an impinging and reflected beam of energy." Id. The downfall of
optical scans is that a ballot is only rejected if all the marks cannot be read, not if
some of the marks are unreadable. Id. This causes some votes not to be cast. Id.
30. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 9. In Minnesota, voters can phone, facsim-
ile, mail, or personally deliver their application for absentee voting. MINN. STAT. §
203B.04 (2000).
31. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 9.
32. 2 Steven D. Imparl, INTERNET LAw: THE COMPLETE GUIDE, at III 4-1 (1998).
33. Id. Some cities have posted ordinances on-line. E.g., http://www. ci.
stpaul.com (the City of St. Paul has its ordinances, administrative code, and city
charter on its web page). Other cities provide for paying city bills or fees online.
E.g., www.indygov.com. Some states post court opinions on-line, but the federal
courts do not. Imparl, supra note 32, at III 4-1; see also http://www.courts.
state.mn.us (The Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals publish their
opinions online).
34. Imparl, supra note 32, at III 4-1. Imparl also comments that governments
are not using the Internet to its "full potential." Id. Hennepin County, Minnesota
has a web site that features an interactive polling site locator and an official sample
ballot for each voting precinct. See http://www.co. hennepin.mn.us /taxsvcs /vote
/geninfo.htm. The Minnesota Secretary of State also has a web site devoted to
voter inquiries. See http://www.sos.state.mn.us/election/index.html.
1802 [Vol. 27:3
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. .. . 35 • 36 • • 37
tivities including banking,"5 proxy voting, paying bills, federal
student loan applications, and purchasing stock. Voting by
means of the Internet "seems a natural extension of this powerful
technology. 40 The benefits of Internet voting is that it can be more
secure, less expensive, less time consuming, more convenient, and
environmentally helpful.4 ' One commentary suggested that at least
42twelve states are considering Internet voting legislation. Internet
voting should be introduced, however, as an alternative for voters,
not as a replacement of traditional polling places. In a poll, forty-
eight percent of the persons polled favored a move to Internet vot-
ing as long as it was secure from fraud.43
A. Barriers To Introducing An Internet Voting System
Several barriers need to be removed before Internet voting sys-
tems can be introduced. "Critics of Internet voting claim that the
technology required to properly authenticate voters and assure the
accuracy and integrity of the election system either does not exist
or is not widespread enough in society to be equitable and effec-
tive." 44 The California Internet Voting Task Force identified several
problems associated with introducing Internet voting systems, in-
cluding digital identification, voter registration, petition signatures,45
and voter access. The technical and security issues surrounding
35. E.g., http://www.bankrate.com.
36. E.g., http://www.proxyvote.com.
37. E.g., http://www.banking.wellsfargo.com.
38. E.g., http://www.fafsa.ed.gov.
39. E.g., http://www.ameritrade.com.
40. Pamela A. Stone, Electronic Ballot Boxes: Legal Obstacles to Voting over the
Internet, 29 MCGEORGE L.REv. 953, 954 (1998).
41. Id. at 960.
42. Deborah M. Phillips & David Jefferson, Is Internet Voting Safe?, (July 10,
2000), at http://www.voting-integrity.org/text/2000/internetsafe.shtml [hereinaf-
ter Is Internet Voting Safe?]. Phillips is the chairperson and president of the Voting
Integrity Project. Voting Integrity Project is a national, nonprofit, nonpartisan
voter rights organization. Id. Dr. David Jefferson is the chairman of the California
Secretary of State's Internet Voting Advisory Committee, a member of the board
of directors of the California Voter Foundation (a nonprofit, nonpartisan voter
advocacy organization), and a senior research scientist with Compaq Systems Re-
search Center in California. Id.
43. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 9. ABC News conducted this poll. Id. In
the age group of 18 to 34 year-olds, sixty-one percent supported Internet voting.
Id. This group is typically the least likely to vote in elections. Id.
44. Id. at 1.
45. California Internet Voting Task Force, supra note 10, at 9. Digital
identification is the process whereby an Internet server is able to identify the
20011 1803
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Internet voting include voter authentication, ballot secrecy, ballot
integrity, reliable vote transport and storage, prevention of multi-
ple voting, and defense against hacker attacks.4
1. Equal Access
The first challenge would be to introduce an Internet voting
system that is equally accessible to all voters. As this paper will later
explore, the litigation involving the Arizona Democratic Primary
arose from the idea that poor and minority voters do not have
equal access to Internet voting systems, because they do not have
computers or Internet access at home or work. "The well-off are
far more likely to have home PCs than the poor."47 Clay Roberts,
Florida's Election Division Director, suggests, "[i]f you have a sys-
tem that makes it easier for the middle class and upper middle class
to vote than the poor, that's a fundamental inequality."
4 8
Persons with disabilities and impairments may also be denied
equal access to Internet voting. 9 Various disabilities, including
physical, visual, auditory, and communication, cultural differences,
economic barriers, and cognitive or neuroloical impairments may
deny a person equal access to the Internet. The Electronic and
Information Technology Access Advisory Committee ("EITAAC"r)'1
is studying the accessibility of the Internet to persons with disabili-
ties. EITAAC is also developing federal standards to regulate the
federal government and parties contracting with the federal gov-
ernment and to ensure that disabled persons have access to services
fication is the process whereby an Internet server is able to identify the person who
is online. Digital signatures are typically used for digital identification. Digital
signatures are not accessible to all voters because of the price. Id. Voter registra-
tion could not be verified over the Internet absent digital signatures. Id. Petitions
could not be verified over the Internet without digital signatures. Id. Moreover,
Internet voting is not accessible to all persons unless all have access to the Inter-
net. Id.
46. California Internet Voting Task Force, supra note 10, at 11.
47. Stephen H. Wildstrom, Online Voting: Click and Be Counted, BUSINESS WEEK,
Apr. 24, 2000, at 1, available at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_17/c36
78076.htm?scriptFramed.
48. Id.
49. Imparl, supra note 32, at III 4-13.
50. Id. at III 4-13 - III 4-14.
51. This committee is under the Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board. Id. at III 4-14. The statutory authority for EITAAC is 29 U.S.C.
§ 794d.
[Vol. 27:31804
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available on the Internet.52
One commentator suggests that setting up computer polls in
several public places, including neighborhood stores, schools, and
51
churches, could ease equal access.
2. Security
An Internet voting system must be secure from Internet at-
tacks.54 A hacker's dream or a terrorist's revenge could be an elec-
tion official's nightmare. A hacker or terrorist could destroy an
Internet voting system with a virus or, even worse, change votes that
were already cast to alter the outcome of an election.56 Hackers
also could create problems such as 'Jamming," "man in the mid-
dle," and "page jacking."
5
1
'Jamming" is when a hacker jams the web site by overloading
requests for information, preventing genuine users from accessing
the site. "Man in the middle" is when the hacker sets up a differ-
ent web site similar to an actual web site.59 Thus, the user is at the
wrong website, but believes he or she is at the correct web site and
enters all the requested information. 60 "Page jacking" is when a
52. Imparl, supra note 32, at III 4-14.
53. Wildstrom, supra note 47, at 2.
54. Id. at 1. Internet systems are more susceptible to attack than standard
polling places. Id.
55. [R]oughly half of those traveling the information super highway
come from outside our borders. This is important in light of recent dis-
closures by the Pentagon that many hostile foreign governments have de-
veloped special capabilities to utilize the Internet for terrorist or warfare
purposes. Developing the ability to interfere with or manipulate the out-
comes of American elections would almost certainly become an attractive
goal of such entities.
The Internet is already host to hackers of all manner from all over
the world. Although the number who are talented and motivated
enough to construct the kinds of programs capable of breaking through
firewalls, gaining root privileges and escaping detection may currently be
limited to a few thousand, but the reality is that it does not take much
talent to write a computer virus and unleash it via the Internet.
Is Internet Voting Safe?, supra note 42, at 4-5.
56. Because the vote has to be separated from the voter's identity, a voter will
only know that his or her vote was cast, not for which candidate it was cast. Id. at 5.
If a voter knew his or her vote was stolen, there is no way to separate that voter's
ballot from the others. Id.
57. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 12.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. In this case, the voter would believe that he or she voted. The hacker
18052001]
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61
user is led off the actual web site to the hacker's web site.
To protect the integrity of the election process, new laws must
be enacted to criminalize certain behaviors, including those men-
tioned above.62
The two types of Internet voting systems, those designed for
polling places and those designed for remote use, present different
security problems. An Internet system for polling systems is more
secure for several reasons.64 Election officials control the election
and the voter is provided with the infrastructure.65 Moreover, pri-
vacy and security protocols are uniform, voting is secret, and an• 66
election official verifies the voter's identity on site.
However, an Internet system for remote systems is less secure.
Election vendors and election officials both control the election• 68
and the voter provides the infrastructure. In addition, a wide va-
riety of computers and operating systems must be supported, voting
may not be secret,69 and the voter's identity is verified online by an
election vendor.70 Both systems "shift control of elections from the
election officials to election vendors because of the technical ex-
pertise required."
7
1
could then use the user's data to place an actual vote.
61. Id. at 12-13. This makes it difficult for the user to complete his or her
transaction. Id.
62. David Elliott, Examining Internet Voting in Washington, at http://www.elec-
tioncenter.org/voting/InetVotingWhitePaper.html. The current laws pertain to
traditional election tampering. Id. These new laws would have to provide penal-
ties for buying, selling, stealing, or giving away your vote; hacking; jamming; voter
coercion, and other actions that would affect the Internet voting process. Id.
63. Is Internet Voting Safe?, supra note 42, at 1. Internet voting systems de-
signed for polling places require the voters to go to their polling place, but instead
of casting a paper ballot, the voters cast an Internet ballot. Internet voting systems
designed for remote sites allow the voters to cast their Internet ballots over the
Internet anywhere as long as they have access to the Internet.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id.
69. See Richard L. Hansen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2000).
There would be no way to ensure the secrecy of the vote. Also, there would be no
way to prevent voters from selling their votes or to prevent coercion. Id. In a net-
work computer system, administrators could monitor their employees' votes. Is
Internet Voting Safe?, supra note 42, at 6.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id.
1806 [Vol. 27:3
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What is the solution to the security problem? Advanced en-
cryption techniques may be helpful but will not solve the prob-
72lem. Moving the votes from web servers to secure computers for
collection is a possible solution. One commentator suggests
"[t]he best answer is vigilance and the use of multiple redundant
servers." 
74
3. Costs
Internet voting systems may offer potential cost savings. 75 If
the election is entirely remote by the Internet, ballot printing costs
would be eliminated, training and employment of election poll
workers would be eliminated, the costs of mailing absentee ballots
could be reduced, and voters would be paying for most of the vot-
76ing infrastructure. For current election systems, ballots must be
specially printed and then inspected individually once printed and
inspected again prior to Election Day.77
An impediment to Internet voting, however, is the cost of set-
ting up new Internet voting systems. Thus, Internet voting could
result in greater costs if used at polling places. 78 Election officials
would maintain responsibility for supplying platforms. 79 However,
computers would probably have to be replaced every three to five80O*
years. "[T]here may be additional software and consumer inter-
face costs resulting from multiple platforms and voter-provision of
infrastructure."8' Technical experts would be necessary to help vot-
ers who were having problems voting. s2 Moreover, verifying the
72. Wildstrom, supra note 47, at 1.
73. Id.
74. Id. Multiple redundant servers are when two or more identical servers are
set up exactly the same way. If one server fails, the process is moved to another
server. Id.
75. Is Internet Voting Safe ?, supra note 42, at 2.
76. Id. at 2-3. The voters would pay for most of the infrastructure because
they would be providing the computers or other devices used to access the Inter-
net to vote. The election officials would only provide the Internet election ballot
on the election website.
77. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 2. "Needless to say, this is an extremely
labor and resource intensive process." Id.
78. Is Internet Voting Safe?, supra note 42, at 2.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. The current election equipment can be used for decades. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2.
2001] 1807
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identity of voters will increase costs and election officials would
have the additional cost of providing and distributing authentica-
tion devices. s4
Purchasing the new Internet systems, developing secure voting
access, and training could be also quite expensive. Nevertheless, in
the long run, an Internet voting system would be less expensive be-
cause the technology will already have been developed and will just
need to be maintained. Eventually, fewer paper ballots will need to
be printed and fewer polling places will need to be provided.
B. Benefits Of Internet Voting Systems
Internet voting can provide many benefits to the election
process.
Proponents of Internet voting believe that the new tech-
nology will increase voter participation, add a much
needed element of convenience to the voting process, al-
low the electorate to be more knowledgeable and in-
formed, greatly increase the efficiency and security of
elections, and make access to the democratic process
85more widely available.
1. Convenience
Internet voting would be convenient for those with access to
the Internet at home or work. It would also be convenient for
those persons out of town on the polling day. Just imagine yourself
sitting at home drinking a cup of coffee during breakfast and turn-
ing on your computer to vote. This would eliminate the race to get
up earlier or leave work earlier to vote. Adding convenience for
some is not the same as denying convenience for those without
86Internet access.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3. This is an additional step for verifying voter identity and would
require personal identification numbers or keys. Id.
85. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 1.
86. James Ledbetter, "Virtual Voting"Faces Real-World Concerns (Mar. 16, 2000),
at http://slate.msn.com/netelection/entries/00-03-16_77458.asp. Having a service
available to everyone is equality. Although everyone does not have access to the
Internet, Internet services should be equally available for everyone to use.
1808 [Vol. 27:3
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2. Fewer Polling Places
In the long run, Internet technology could eliminate the need
for all the polling places to be open. This would save the time and
money used to train poll workers and staff polling facilities.
3. Higher Voter Turnout
Currently, voter turnout is at an historic low. 81 In Minnesota,
the voter turnout rate was just over sixty-four percent in the 1996
presidential elections.88 This was the highest percentage out of all
89fifty states. Overall turnout for all fifty states was only less than
fifty percent.9° Turnout rates are dramatically lower for congres-
sional and local elections. Internet voting could increase the voter
turnout rates. "Indeed, the ability to vote via the Internet could re-
sult in greater participation by business executives, overseas mili-
tary, and the young-three groups that could have ready access to
the Internet and who typically have lower participation rates."91 If
people had easier access to ballots, they may be more inclined to
vote.
IV. INTERNET VOTING SYSTEMS
The key to a successful online election is authentication, pri-
vacy, security, and equity.92 The system must be able to verify that
93online voters are using their own identity to vote. Once the votersare identified correctly, the system must remove all voter informa-
87. Is Internet Voting Safe?, supra note 42, at 1. As of the date of this article, the
Federal Election Commission had not yet published voter turnout rates for the
2000 presidential election.
88. Voter Registration and Turnout, Federal Election Commission, at
<http://www.fec.gov/pages/96to.htm. The voting age population for Minnesota
was 3,422,000; out of that number, 3,067,802 were registered to vote. Id. Thus
89.65% of the voting age population was registered to vote. Id. Even though the
total voting age population, total number of registered voters, and the total num-
ber of votes cast have increased, the percentage of registered voters who turn out
to vote has decreased since 1960. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The voting age population for the United States was 196,511,000; out
of that number 146,211,960 were registered to vote. Id. Thus 74.40 percent of the
voting age population was registered to vote. Id.
91. Id.; California Internet Voting Task Force, supra note 10, at 22.
92. Wildstrom, supra note 47, at 1.
93. Id.
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tion from the actual vote to preserve voter secrecy. 94 Ballots must
be secure from fraud, tampering, and terrorism. Equal voting ac-
96cess must be provided to all voters.
One expert suggests a system that may fulfill the above re-
quirements. Voters would have to sign up to vote online in the
98election. Each voter who signed up would be "mailed a disk con-
taining a cryptographic key and an affidavit, which they must sign
and return. The key, which is required to vote, is only activated af-
ter the affidavit is checked against the signature on file."99
"[C]omputer software will encrypt [the] e-ballot, then encrypt the
package with a different key, to generate the anonymous enve-
lope."1°°
Another expert suggests a different system to fulfill the re-
quirements. 0' The voter prepares a voted ballot and encrypts it
with a secret key. 102 The voter uses a blind signature on the bal-
lot. 0 3 Then, the voter sends the ballot to a validator, who verifies
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. This includes those who do not have access to the Internet at home or
work. Id.
97. Id. (citing a suggestion made by Jim Adler, President and CEO of Vote-
Here.net.) Id. Founded in 1996, VoteHere.net is a provider of Internet voting lo-
cated in Bellevue, Washington, at http://votehere.net/VH-Content-v2.0/company
info. html. Adler graduated from the University of Florida with a Bachelor of Sci-
ence in electrical engineering and The University of California, San Diego with a
Master of Science in electrical engineering. Id. Because of his reputation as an
expert in cryptography and Internet security, Adler served as a member on Cali-
fornia's Internet Voting Task Force Committee. Id.
98. Wildstrom, supra note 47, at 1.
99. Id.
100. Id. This process is similar to the envelopes for absentee voting. Id. "An
absentee voter puts the ballot into an unmarked envelope, which is placed inside
another envelope that he or she signs and seals before mailing. At the election
office, the outer envelope is discarded before the anonymous inner one is
opened." Id.
101. Lorrie Faith Cranor, Electronic Voting: Computerized Polls May Save Money,
Protect Privacy 5 (1996), at http://info.acm.org/crossroads/xrds2-4/voting. html.
Cranor, an expert in Internet voting, has a web site devoted entirely to Internet
Voting. See http://www.ccrc.wustl.edu/-lorracks/sensus/hot list. html. The web
site provides links to various Internet voting providers, voting equipment vendors,
several sites publishing information on Internet voting, and other relevant mate-
rial. Id. Cranor currently works as a Senior Technical Staff Member of the Secure
Systems Department at AT&T Labs-Research in New Jersey. See http://www.re-
search.att.com/-lorrie/.
102. Cranor, supra note 101, at 5.
103. Id.
1810 [Vol. 27:3
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/6
CAST YOUR BALLOT. COM
that the signature belongs to that registered voter.0 4 If valid, the
validator will sign and return the ballot to the voter.' ° The voter
then removes the signatures or unbinds the ballot, revealing an en-
crypted ballot signed by the validator.'06 Next, the voter sends the
ballot to the vote tallier."' If the ballot is valid, the tallier will pub-
lish the name of the voter who votes and the voter must verify his or
her ballot is on the list."' The voter then sends the vote tallier his
or her decryption key and the tallier publishes the encrypted ballot
and key for vote verification.1°9
Both of the above Internet voting systems seek to provide pos-
sible solutions to the basic problems with Internet voting. Al-
though each system looks good on paper, the true colors will shine
through when the systems are tested. Without extensive testing
and legislative analysis of Internet voting systems, the perfect system
is unknown.
Many different organizations have tried and used Internet vot-
ing for elections; however, organizational elections do not hold the
same high integrity that federal, state, and local elections do.
Two states have used Internet voting technology in the past
year: Alaska and Arizona. The Alaskan Republican Party con-
ducted a straw poll in January 2000 and the Arizona Democratic
Party conducted a presidential primary in March 2000. Two more
states are studying Internet voting. California organized an Inter-
net voting task force through legislation to examine Internet voting
systems. The state of Washington soon followed in organizing its
own Internet voting task force.
Unfortunately, Minnesota has not conducted any Internet vot-
ing elections nor has it enacted legislation to analyze this emerging
voting technology. Many election officials are reluctant to try
Blind signatures are a class of digital signatures that allow a document to
be signed without revealing its contents. The effect is similar to placing a
document and a sheet of carbon paper inside an envelope. If somebody
signs the outside of the envelope, they also sign the document in the in-
side of the envelope. The signature remains attached to the document,
even when it is removed from the envelope.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Internet voting because of fear of the unknown. Clay Roberts, Flor-
ida Elections Division Director, stated: "I'm very worried that some
jurisdiction will have an online election that turns into a disaster.
That would set back a technology that could be a boon for every-
one." 
110
A. States Using Internet Voting Technology
1. Alaska Straw Poll
The Alaskan Republican Party conducted a straw poll over the
Internet in January 2000.' Three remote congressional districts
were allowed to vote in the straw poll over the Internet.112 Vote-
Here.Net provided the Internet voting technology for the poll.1
13
VoteHere.Net sent eligible voters software, which had to be in-
stalled on the voter's computer to enable him or her to vote.114
Three thousand one hundred persons were eligible to vote online;
however, only thirty-five persons voted in the poll via the Inter-
net.' 15 The figures may be lower than expected because it was a
straw poll instead of a general election.
2. Arizona Democratic Primary
Arizona held the first statewide election on the Internet.
However, the process used by the Arizona democrats was criticized
as inadequate. 16 This process included mailing each voter a per-
sonal identification number, which allowed a vote to be cast. ' Sev-
110. Wildstrom, supra note 47, at 1. It is hard to imagine a ballot disaster
worse than the one Florida had in the 2000 presidential election.
111. James Ledbetter, Net Out the Vote: Arizona's Democratic Primary Has Been
Hailed as the First Successful Online Election. Will Net Voting Boost Turnout-Or Exacer-
bate the Digital Divide?, THE INDUS. STANDARD 116 (Mar. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,13004,00.html [hereinafter
Net Out the Vote]. "Kathleen Dalton, a member of the Alaska Straw Poll Committee,
commented, 'Internet voting will open up a completely new domain to an Alaskan
population that is handicapped by vast distances, lack of land transportation
routes, and slow or interrupted postal service in winter months.'" Dictson & Ray,
supra note 2, at 23.
112. Net Out the Vote, supra note 111, at 123.
113. Id. at 121.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 116. This figure includes Alaskan congressional members who
voted from Washington, DC. Id.
116. Wildstrom, supra note 47, at 1.
117. Id.
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Several voters never received their personal identification numbers
and had to go to polling places. Several voters could not vote
over the Internet because they had older model web browsers.
Moreover, the process did not provide for a sophisticated tracking
system to verify the correct person was voting.' 0 While 85,970 votes
were cast in the primary, only about half were cast online.12 1 Of
those votes cast online, ninety percent were estimated to have been
cast from voters' homes or work offices. 2
The Arizona Democrats teamed up with Election.com to hold
123the election online. Election.com reported the election as a suc-
cess.124 However several reasons suggest otherwise.
First, Election.com ran the election for the Arizona Democrats•• 125
with no supervision or certification by election officials. This is
problematic because election officials are trained in election se-
crecy and integrity. Second, the election was vulnerable to service
denial. 12  Thus, if too many voters tried to cast their ballot at the
118. Net Out the Vote, supra note 111, at 126. Mark Fleisher, Arizona Demo-
cratic Chairman, acknowledged that several persons did not receive PIN numbers
and suggested that some threw their PIN numbers out because they perceived
them to be junk mail. Id.
119. Id. Joe Mohen, Chief Executive Officer of Election.com, explained "that
for security reasons, the sites ran numerous Java applets, which older versions of
Netscape, Explorer and AOL browsers couldn't handle." Id.
120. Wildstrom, supra note 47, at 1. Election officials had no way to verify if a
vote was lost or stolen or whether the correct person was voting it. Id.
121. Net Out the Vote, supra note 111, at 127. Thirty-two thousand one hundred
fifty-nine of the votes were cast by mail and 18,000 or so went to the polls to vote.
Id. The voters in the primary represented a mere ten percent of the registered
voters. Id.
122. Id.
123. Net Out the Vote, supra note 111, at 116. Election.com is a private industry
founded in 1999 in Garden City, New York. The 100 List, Red Herring (Jason Pon-
tin, ed.), at 111, 144 (June 2000). Election.com "[p ] rovides Internet-based public
and private election services for governments, trade associations, labor unions,
school districts, credit unions, and large corporations. Competing with others like
Voter.com and Grassroots.com in a market estimated at $10 billion annually in
election costs and related materials and services." Id.
124. Net Out the Vote, supra note 111, at 116. Election.com held the election
and received attention in the news worldwide. Id. See also Is Internet Voting Safe?,
supra note 42, at 1 (stating Election.com claimed success because there were no
proven security lapses).
125. Is Internet Voting Safe?, supra note 42, at 7.
126. Id. Similar attacks were made on Yahoo, CNN, Ebay, and other web por-
trayals earlier this year. Id. Election.com acknowledged this vulnerability by sus-
pending voting over the Internet on the final day. Id. Individuals' personal com-
puters were vulnerable to virus attacks that could have destroyed or changed votes.
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same time, the voting system would have denied service to some
voters. A service denial would disenfranchise some voters who only
had one opportunity in their busy schedules to vote. Third, voter
identification was minimal and voter privacy was vulnerable. 1 7 The
possibility for fraud is great when personal identification numbers
are mailed to voters. If a person lived in an apartment and re-
ceived three other voters' personal identification numbers, they
could vote four times if so inclined because the voter authentica-
tion was minimal. Fourth, some computers and systems were in-
compatible with Election.com's voting site. Fifth, the site was not
working for a full hour on the first day of the election.9 Finally,
neither Election.com nor the Arizona Democrats took statistics to
show the number of voters who attempted to vote online but were
denied service. 13
3. Litigation Brought By Voting Integrity Project
Arizona's Internet election was challenged prior to its occur-
rence in a federal court. The Voting Integrity Project ("VIP") ,131
one African American man, and one Hispanic woman filed a law-
suit against the Arizona Democrats. l13 They sought an injunction in
federal court to stop the election.' 33 Their complaint alleged un-
equal access and discrimination in violation of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.'3 The President of VIP, Deborah Phillips, stated
"Internet voting, however well-intentioned, is not secure from fraud
and is grossly unfair to persons without Internet access. This is just
Id. For example the "Love Bug" or "I love you" virus from May of 2000 "infected
45 million computers in 20 countries and caused an estimated $8 billion in dam-
age." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Many older computers, older Netscape browsers, and Macintosh
computers were unable to connect to vote. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. "VIP is a non-partisan, non-profit, public interest organization based in
Arlington, Virginia, dedicated to promoting the integrity of American elections
and protecting the fundamental right to vote." Press Release, Voting Integrity Pro-
ject, VIP Files Voting Rights Lawsuit to Block Internet Voting in AZ Dem Primary
(Jan. 21, 2000), at http://www.voting-integrity.org/text/2000/relO12100.shtml.
(hereinafter VIP Filesl.
132. Id. at 1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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a millennium version of the literacy test."
135
Voters with Internet access had four full days to vote, while
those without had one day, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., to vote.
16
Historically, voting access has always been limited to one day for
everyone. The discrimination allegation was based on "digital di-
vide" 37 statistics from a recent United States Department of Com-
merce report showing that "whites are more likely to have Internet
access from home than most racial and ethnic minorities from any
location, including home, work, school, or library.' 138 One com-
mentator approved of the litigation, arguing that the five days
available to those with Internet access clearly violated the law.
This argument was made under the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. 14° By giving some people and not oth-
ers a longer period to exercise their right to vote, equal protection
was violated. U.S. District Judge Paul G. Rosenblatt did not grant
VIP's injunction, but suggested that the votes could be thrown out
if the election resulted in racial discrimination.
14
1
The online election is also under the scrutiny of the United
States Justice Department. 142 The Justice Department sent a letter
to the Arizona Democratic Party informing it that the Department
would allow the election to go forward but would review the re-
sults.'
43
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. "Digital divide" is a term used to explain the gap between the people with
Internet access and the number of people without Internet access.
138. VIPFiles, supra note 131, at 2. In 1998, the Commerce Department found
that non-Hispanic whites had eighty-three percent of in-home Internet access,
even though they only were sixty-eight percent of Arizona's population. Ben
White, On-line Balloting: A Question of Fairness, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 19, 2000, at
A09 [hereinafter White].
139. Id. (citing a comment by Professor Michael Confield of George Washing-
ton University). Prof. Confield, who studies the politics of the Internet, argued
further by stating, "It just wasn't fair to give people who had Web knowledge and
Web access four more days to vote than people who didn't .... In Federalist 57,
Uames] Madison said, 'Who are to be the electors? .... Not the rich, more than
the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant.'" Id.
140. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. If the election laws give some voters more
days to vote, then the other voters are not being equally protected under the law.
141. White, supra note 138, at A09.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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B. Legislative Committees'Analyses Of Internet Voting Systems
1. California
Bill Jones, California Secretary of State, held the first meeting
of California's new online voting task force in March 1999.'4 Cali-
fornia was the first state to or anize a commission to explore the
possibility of Internet voting. The report on the feasibility of
Internet voting was completed in January 2000.146
144. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 22.
145. Id. at 4.
146. California Internet Voting Task Force, supra note 10, at 1. The purpose
of the task force was to identify legal and technical challenges to implementing
Internet voting. Id. at 5. The California Task force consisted of several members
with different areas of expertise. Id. Alfred Charles, Assistant Secretary of State
for eGovernment was, the Task Force Chairman of the committee. Id. David
Jefferson, Systems Engineer for Compaq Computers, served as the Technology
Chairman. Id. Linda Valenty, Assistant Professor of Political Science at San Jose
State University, was the Policy Issues Chairperson. Id. The regular task force
committee members and their place of employment are the following: Jim Adler,
VoteHere.net; Pete Adlerberg, VoteHere.net; Sylvia Ahern, Sterling Software; Kim
Alexander, California Voter Foundation; Michael Alvarez, California Institute of
Technology; Dwight Beattie, Sacramento County Elections; Kaye Caldwell, Silicon
Valley Software Industry Coalition; Jacquie Canfield, League of Women Voters;
Assemblyman Jim Cunneen, State Capitol; Steve Cunningham, Cisco Systems;
Roger Dao, County of Santa Clara; Tim Draper, Draper, Fisher, Jurvetson; Brian
Gangler, Secretary of State; Pam Giarrizzo, Secretary of State; Mikel Haas, San
Diego County Registrar of Voters; Tom Hill, Secretary of State; Thad Howard, The
Howard Agency; Steve Knecht, Global Election Systems; Rom Lopez, Assembly
Elections Committee; Stacey Morgan, Assemblyman Jim Cunneen; John Mott-
Smith, Secretary of State; Phillip Muller, Political Technologies, Inc.; Jonathan
Nagler, UC Riverside; Cameron O'Rourke, Oracle; Mark Reynolds, iLumin Cor-
poration; Joe Rodota, FAQvoter.com; Peter Schmidt, Cisco Systems; Warren
Slocum, San Mateo County Assessor/Clerk/Recorder; Larry Sokol, Senate Elec-
tions Committee; Bernard Soriano, Secretary of State; and James L. Wayman, Na-
tional Biometric Test Center. Id. at 5-6. Regardless of the feasibility of Internet
voting, the legislature would be required to approve Internet voting before im-
plementation. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 22. Internet voting is not provided
for in the current laws of California. California Internet Task Force, supra note 10,
at 8.
[T]hree stages of government approval may be required: 1) The State
Legislature would have to amend the elections code to adapt the current
paper-ballot voting requirements to the electronic voting and vote tabula-
tion process, 2) The Secretary of State would need to review and certify
specific election systems for use by county election offices, and 3) County
officials would have to agree to purchase and implement the new Inter-
net voting systems once they appear on the Secretary of State's list of Ap-
proved Election Systems.
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The task force opined that Internet voting could increase voter
participation among those with Internet access who regularly do
not vote.147 The task force advised, "the election process would be
best served by a strategy of evolutionary rather than revolutionary
change." 148 Thus, it recommended the Internet should be used as
an additional method of voting in the beginning. 49 The task force
suggested two phases for the evolution of Internet voting. 150 Phase
one would use Internet voting technology at traditional polling
places. Phase two would utilize remote Internet voting systems.1
This phased-in approach provides for gradual testing of Internet
voting systems.
2. Washington
The state of Washington soon followed California by creating a
similar task force. 54 The Washington task force, led by Washington
Secretary of State Ralph Munro, focused on voter authentication
and privacy.115 Washington explored the option of Internet voting
because it desired to provide convenience for voters. 16
147. California Internet Task Force, supra note 10, at 1.
148. Id. at 2-3.
149. Id. The task force concluded that, at this time, a remote Internet voting
system is not "legally, practically or fiscally feasible" to "completely replace the cur-
rent paper process used for voter registration, voting, and the collection of initia-
tive, referendum and recall petition signatures." Id. If remote Internet voting sys-
tems are eventually adopted they it should be modeled after the current absentee
process. Id. at 2.
150. Id. at 3.
151. California Internet Task Force, supra note 10, at 3. "In this phase, voters
would not yet gain the advantage of voting from any place at any time, but the in-
tegrity of the voting and tabulation technology will be verified through the use of
Internet Voting Machines." Id. Stage one of this phase would have the voter vote
at the voter's neighborhood polling place. Id. at 10. Stage two of this phase would
allow the voter to vote at any polling site within his or her county. Id.
152. California Internet Task Force, supra note 10, at 3. In the remote system,
"authentication of voter identity would take place with a combination of manual
and electronic procedures that would provide at least the same level of security as
the existing voting process." Id. Stage one of this phase would include providing
the voter with digital signatures to vote on county computers at specified locations
which are not staffed by poll workers. Id. at 10. Stage two of this phase would al-
low the voter to vote from any computer so long as the connection is secure. Id.
153. Id. at 10.
154. Dictson & Ray, supra note 2, at 22.
155. Id.
156. Elliott, supra note 62, at 1. David Elliott is the assistant director of elec-
tions for the State of Washington. Id.
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Washington has an overwhelming majority of its voters using
either absentee voting or voting by mail. 57 Washington concluded
that the use of absentee voting and voting by mail has increased
voter participation because both are more convenient for voters.
5
8
Another convenience Washington enacted for its voters was to
change the cutoff date for voter registration from thirty days to fif-
teen days prior to election day. 59 Washington believes that voter
convenience would be furthered even more with Internet voting. 160
Washington studied three types of Internet voting models.16
First, Internet voting could be used as an imitation of the current
absentee process. 16The ballots would be distributed to the voter
over secure e-mail. 63 The voter would have the option of printing
the ballot and mailing it back or returning the ballot via secure e-
mail. 64
Second, Internet voting could be accomplished from a voting
165web site. In this system a voter would log onto the web site
through secure means, establish his or her identity with an identify-
ing key, and vote a ballot on the web site. 66
157. Id. In fact, the proportion of voters receiving their ballots via mail will
soon be the majority. Id. Washington also allows voters to request absentee ballot
via mail, telephone, or in person. Id. at 2. This request can be ongoing to allow
the voter to vote in all elections by absentee ballot. Id. Absentee ballots are deliv-
ered by the United States Postal Service or given to the voter in person. Id. The
absentee ballot is filled out by the voter and placed in a secure envelope. Id. The
secured envelope is then sealed inside another envelope, which the voter has
signed under oath. Id. When the election office receives the absentee ballot, they
verify the signature with the signature in the voter's file. Once the signature is
verified, the outer envelope is discarded, leaving the ballot in the secure envelope.
Id. The envelopes are opened on election day and the ballots are counted. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at2.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id. The advantage of this system is that the voter more easily understands
the process, each vote is handled as an individual transaction, and the ballots are
less susceptible to hacker attacks. Id. This system would also require procedures
to make sure each voter only votes once and has a secure and secret ballot. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. A voter could vote from home, office, or a library over a several day
period. Id. This system would be similar to most transactions that occur over the
Internet. Id. The voting web site could also provide on-line help to voters. Id.
The web site could also provide a variety of different languages for the voter to
chose from. Id. Of course, this system would be vulnerable to the types of hacker
problems that were mentioned earlier. Id. at 3. Washington suggests that the so-
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Third, Internet voting could be utilized at the current polling167
locations. The election officials would verify the identity of the
voter and configure the correct ballot to the computer terminal,
and then the voter would cast his or her ballot. This system
would allow the voters to use any polling site within their county
because all ballots would be available through the central server.
Washington also suggests that digital signature technology
would provide the most secure voter identity for transactions.
Unfortunately, this technology is too expensive for the individual
voter or the government to provide." Washington's conclusion
about Internet voting is that "[g]overnment's job is to provide the
convenience of an online voting system while making no compro-
mise of the democratic election system.'
172
Although both California and Washington have analyzed
Internet voting, they have only begun the long process toward en-
acting Internet voting in election statutes. Both states analyzed the
Internet voting benefits, problems, and technology. Both made
recommendations to their legislatures on how to proceed. This
approach is logical and commendable. Other states should use this
approach to introduce Internet voting in their states.
lution to the hacker related problems is "to create over-capacity, either by spread-
ing the voting period over several weeks or through more equipment." Id. Web
capacity must be adequate for the number of people that will be visiting the web
site. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. "Currently, a voter's ballot can only be found in his or her neighbor-
hood." Id. For example, if a person was registered to vote in the city of New
Brighton, Ramsey County, Minnesota, he or she would be able to vote anywhere in
Ramsey County. If that person worked in downtown St. Paul, he or she could vote
at a downtown polling site over lunch or on a break instead of adjusting their work
schedule to vote at a designated neighborhood polling site. This would add con-
venience to the voting process for voters. Advantages of this system would be re-
duced printing costs and convenience for the voter. Id.
170. Id. at 4. Digital signatures are an electronic form of a signature used to
verify a person's identity. Since there are various levels of digital signatures, not all
types are secured the same way. Id. Some digital signatures require several types
of identification and personal interviews, while others have minimal, if any, re-
quirements for acquiring a digital signature. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 5.
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C. Minnesota Election Laws
1. Current State Of The Law
Currently Minnesota's voting system does not provide for
Internet voting. Although the Secretary of State has authority to
approve voting machines before they can be implemented, the Sec-
retary's authority is not broad enough to approve Internet voting
systems. The barrier to adopting an Internet voting system is the
ballot requirement. Absent the legislature making a statutory
change, Internet voting will not be a possibility in Minnesota.
a. Printing Of Ballots
The Minnesota Statutes fully address voting and ballot re-
quirements.' The Minnesota Rules also provide guidance. 17 4 "All
ballots shall be printed with black ink on paper of sufficient thick-
ness ... and shall be printed in easily readable type with suitable
lines dividing candidates, offices, instructions and other matters
printed on the ballot.'' 175 Minnesota Statutes further require whatS 176
color paper should be used for each election. The rules also re-
173. MINN. STAT. §§ 200-211 (2000). Other federal and constitutional laws also
apply. According to the United States Constitution, "[t]he times, places, and man-
ner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each state by the legislature thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Certain federal
provisions are mandatory and regulate all state elections; these are found in
United States Code Annotated and the United States Constitution. The voting re-
quirements for Minnesota are found in the Minnesota Constitution and Statutes.
The Minnesota Constitution addresses the eligibility and place of voting. MINN.
CONST. art. 7, § 1. It provides:
Every person 18 years of age or more who has been a citizen of the
United States for three months and who has resided in the precinct for
30 days next preceding an election shall be entitled to vote in that pre-
cinct. The place of voting by one otherwise qualified who has changed
his residence within 30 days preceding the election shall be prescribed by
law. The following persons shall not be entitled or permitted to vote at
any election in this state: A person not meeting the above requirements;
a person who has been convicted of treason or felony, unless restored to
civil rights; a person under guardianship, or a person who is insane or
not mentally competent.
Id. It also provides that all elections must be by ballot. MINN. CONST. art. 7, § 5. It
provides that "[a]ll elections shall be by ballot except for such town officers as may
be directed by law to be otherwise chosen." Id.
174. MINN. R. 8220-8230 (2000).
175. MINN. STAT. § 204B.36, subd. 1 (2000).
176. "The candidates for partisan offices shall be placed first on the white bal-
1820 [Vol. 27:3
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quire "paper ballot procedures as provided in Minnesota election
law must be followed to the extent possible." 77 The statutes also
require the ballots to be printed in advance to polling. Thus, this is
an impediment to voting by means of the Internet.
b. Secret Ballots
Minnesota Statutes require voting to be secret.7 8 No one shall
assist the voter in marking his or her ballot.' 79 If the voter inten-
tionally shows a ballot to another person, it will not be recorded.80
To preserve a secret ballot, political party preferences shall not be
noted nor shall any identifying marks be made on the ballot.""
c. Mail Ballots
.... 182
Minnesota statutes also provide for mail balloting, but that is183
limited to cities having fewer than 400 registered voters. The
counties of Ramsey and Kittson can also request the Secretary of
lot and shall appear" in the order designated by statute. MINN. STAT. § 204D.13,
subd. 1 (2000). "The names of candidates for nonpartisan offices on the canary
ballot shall be rotated in the manner provided for." Id. § 204D.14, subd. 1. Con-
stitutional amendments shall be printed on pink paper. Id. § 204D.15, subd. 1.
Candidates for municipal offices shall be printed on light green paper for second,
third, and fourth class cities; candidates for first class cities shall be printed on
light orange paper. MINN. STAT. § 205.17, subd. 1-2 (2000). "All questions relat-
ing to the adoption of a city charter or charter amendment.., shall be printed on
one separate blue ballot. . . ." Id. § 205.17, subd. 4. "The ballots for municipal
elections must be prepared by the municipal clerk in the manner provided in the
rules of the secretary of state." Id. § 205.17, subd. 6. These statutes all require
black ink printed on paper of a certain color.
177. MINN. R. 8230.0150 (2000). The rules also specify the printing require-
ments. MINN. R. 8230.0560.
178. MINN. STAT. § 204C.17 (2000). "[A] voter shall not reveal to anyone in
the polling place the name of any candidate for whom the voter intends to vote or
has voted." Id.
179. Id. The statute reads, "A voter shall not ask for or receive assistance in the
marking of a ballot from anyone within the polling place except as authorized by
section 204C.15." Id. Section 204C.15 provides for assistance for those who need
an interpreter or other accommodations because of a handicap. Id.
180. Id. "If a voter, after marking a ballot, shows it to anyone except as author-
ized by law, the election judges shall refuse to deposit the ballot in any ballot box
and shall place it among the spoiled ballots. Unless the showing of the ballot was
clearly intentional, the voter shall receive another ballot ...." Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 204B.45.
183. Id. § 204B.45, subd. 1. The city must request permission from the county
auditor to do mail balloting. Id.
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State to authorize the conduct of experimental mail balloting. 184
2. Feasibility Of Introducing Internet Voting In Minnesota
Minnesota's current laws do not provide for an Internet voting
system. The Minnesota Secretary of State's position is that an elec-
tion cannot be held via the Internet under current law.
85
The laws do provide for electronic voting systems. Minnesota
law requires the secretary of state to approve the electronic voting
systems if those systems meet certain requirements:1
86
An electronic voting system may not be employed unless
it:
(1) permits every voter to vote in secret;
(2) permits every voter to vote for all candidates and ques-
tions for whom or upon which the voter is legally entitled
to vote;
(3) provides for write-in voting when authorized;
(4) rejects by means of automatic tabulating equipment,
except as provided in section 206.84 with respect to write-
in votes, all votes for an office or question when the num-
ber of votes cast on it exceeds the number which the voter
is entitled to cast;
(5) permits a voter at a primary election to select secretly
the party for which he wishes to vote; and
(6) rejects, by means of the automatic tabulating equip-
ment, all votes cast in a primary election by a voter when
the voter votes for candidates of more than one party.""
For electronic voting systems, " [t] he ballot information.. .must
be in the same order provided for paper ballots, except that the in-
formation may be in vertical or horizontal rows, or on a number of
separate pages. The secretary of state shall provide by rule for
standard ballot formats for electronic voting systems. This re-
quirement does not state "paper;" it states "pages." Web pages may
184. Id. at subd. la. The request must be made 90 days prior to the election.
Id.
185. Memorandum from J. Bradley King, Director of Elections Division, to
Mary Kiffmeyer, Minnesota Secretary of State, (June 7, 2000) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Memorandum].
186. MINN. STAT. § 206.57 (2000).
187. Id. § 206.80.
188. Id. § 206.84, subd. 3.
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be sufficient to fulfill this requirement. Nevertheless, this interpre-
tation was not contemplated or even dreamed of by the drafters of
the statute.19
Internet voting could also be modeled after absentee ballots,
which are valid in Minnesota. The ballots for absentee voting "shall
conform to the requirements of Minnesota election law, except
that modifications in the size or form of ballots or envelopes may
be made if necessary to satisfy the requirements of the United
States postal service." 19 Absentee ballots are required to be mailed
back with certain personal information and an affidavit stating the
voter voted by him or herself. 9' Internet voting could conform to
these standards by mailing each voter a P.I.N. (personal identifica-
tion number) and asking relevant identification questions online.
The Internet ballot could look the same as a regular ballot with the
same color, format, and write-in lines. Instead of punching or
marking a paper ballot, the voter could mark an "X" in the box
next to his other desired candidate. The vote could be confirmed
by a computer question of "are you sure you want to vote for can-
didate X?""' Then the voter would transmit the ballot when he or
she was done voting. Internet voting may be even more reliable
than sending absentee ballots by mail.
V. CONCLUSION
Several steps must occur before Internet voting can replace
traditional polling places. First, laws and regulations must be en-
acted to provide for the use of the Internet for voting systems. Sec-
ond, voter identification, ballot secrecy, and security must be pro-
189. Memorandum, supra note 185. The memorandum stated:
[T]he term "ballot" has not been construed in this manner in the past,
and clearly the legislative authors of [these statutes] would not have con-
templated Internet voting when [these] statute[s] [were] enacted. Al-
though there are similarities between Internet technology and some pro-
cedures authorized under current law (such as the transmission of
election returns by modem from some precincts), it would be at least a
"stretch" to read most of the state general election statutes to permit the
use of Internet technology, either in casting a ballot from a PC in a
voter's home, or by placing a PC in a polling place with ballots being
generated electronically and transmitted to a central location.
Id.
190. MiNN. STAT. § 203B.21, subd. 1 (2000).
191. Id. § 203B.21.
192. Stone, supra note 40, at 980.
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vided for. Third, each voter must have equal access to Internet vot-
ing systems. Fourth, technology must be explored further to de-
velop an Internet voting system that will be easy to use and conven-
ient, but at the same time protect the sacred ballot. Fifth, states
and the Federal Election Commission must test the Internet sys-
tems prior to use. So far all the systems look good on paper but
have not been subjected to essential testing by election experts and
officials.
As Internet voting systems are being introduced, states are
carefully watching for new advancements. Even if a state's laws do
provide for Internet voting technology, a state must ensure an
Internet voting system will not compromise democracy and voting
integrity. A state would have to decide how it wanted to use the
Internet. The California approach very wisely suggests an evolution
to Internet voting instead of a revolutionary change. A state could
model Internet voting after its current absentee ballot proces, or it
could utilize the Internet Voting systems at polling places. This
would allow for a more controlled environment.
Internet Voting will be customary within the next decade. In
the meantime, voters will have to continue to walk, jog, bike, or
drive to their polling place and relish the fading civic ritual of go-
ing to a polling place, filling out a ballot, casting a ballot, and re-
ceiving an "I voted" sticker.
1824 [Vol. 27:3
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